The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

THE real significance of the recent atomic tests in Nevada is that the United States now has new field weapons of great versatility. The distinction between the new atomic weapons and the first Hiroshima bomb is not so much in the size of the explosion as in the size of the weapons themselves. Constant ordnance work has produced a much less cumbersome triggering mechanism—hence weapons that are far more portable than the old, heavy type.

It is no longer necessary to have a B-29 or lumbering B-36 bomber carry the atom bomb; the fast F-84 Thunderjet and several new planes soon to be in production also can carry it. The Army has developed an artillery piece to shoot atomic shells, and there is notable progress in guided missiles which will use atomic warheads.

Practically, this means that the country has greatly increased the battlefield utility of its atomic arsenal. Whereas the old-type atom bomb was primarily a weapon of mass destruction against, cities, the newer and lighter weapons could be used effectively against enemy tactical concentrations or to destroy airfields or deny territory. In the Nevada tests Army troops have been conditioned to enter the explosion area shortly after the detonation. The knowledge gained is being passed along to our North Atlantic Treaty allies, although they have not been invited to participate in the tests.

In Korea as in Western Europe, the new tactical atomic weapons will be a tremendous aid to the defensive. Particularly in Korea, they are considered an answer to Communist mass armies—and their availability is one reason why officials here are not overworried about the Communist. build-up. Because of the terrain in Korea, it might not be possible to employ atomic weapons with maximum effectiveness against enemy troop concentrations. An atomic bomb would destroy military positions in, say, a single valley, but the mountains would shield other troops from the blast. Against Manchurian airfields, however, atomic weapons would be devastating. The plan is not to use atomic weapons when conventional arms will suffice, but they are ready for use in case the United Nations position in Korea is seriously threatened.

Meanwhile, there is a parallel development in atomic energy that holds great promise for nonmilitary use. In mid-June President Truman laid the keel for the Navy’s new atomic-powered submarine, the Nautilus, at Groton, Connecticut. This submarine, when completed, will represent the first practical application of atomic power.

The patient and the AMA

Few persons have been able to tell off the leadership of the American Medical Association so effectively as Dr. Paul B. Magnuson did at the AMA convention in Chicago. Dr. Magnuson had good reason to be angry. As chairman of the President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation he has been under constant attack from the AMA heads as a captive of “socialized medicine.” Yet Dr. Magnuson, a Republican, is a bitter and outspoken foe of the Ewing plan for compulsory health insurance.

The outgoing president of the AMA, Dr. John W. Cline, charged that the new commission was a political move designed to take President Truman “off the hook.” To this Dr. Magnuson replied that Dr. Cline’s attacks have done more harm to the American doctor than anything that has happened in the last ten years. “ It has gotten to the point,” he added, “that any health legislation proposed to Congress no sooner is introduced than highly paid publicists spew forth a stream of invective which has little or no relation to the issue at hand.”

As a matter of fact, the very appointment of the Magnuson commission last winter was an acknowledgment that the Ewing plan is dead. The fifteenman commission has no doctrinaire instruction; it is to take a new look at health problems and come up with fresh recommendations. It is to survey means of ensuring a sufficient supply of doctors, of making more hospital beds available, of meeting the needs of the chronically ill and aged, and of providing adequate health services to persons of all income groups.

No one who knows Dr. Magnuson can believe that he is a captive of anything except his deep conviction that the patient must come first. An outstanding Chicago orthopedic surgeon, he is the man who built the veterans’ medical care program after the war by enlisting the coöperation of leading medical schools — until he was summarily fired by Veterans Administrator Gray after complaining of interference. Though an opponent of government medicine, he feels strongly that the nation’s underlying health needs are not being met. “We have licked the Ewing plan,” he says, “but not the problem.”

Undoubtedly one scheme which the commission will explore is Dr. Magnuson’s own idea for regional health clinics to serve several rural counties. These clinics could bring together expert surgeons, diagnosticians, and other specialists with equipment that few doctors individuallycould afford. At the same time, by enlarging the base of medical practice, they would ensure full use of professional skills and equipment.

It is perhaps indicative of the feeling among rank and file AMA members — as opposed to the leadership— that a move to censure Dr. Magnuson and his commission was beaten down.

Crime in the Capital

One of the problems of a voteless city is indifference to the affairs of local government, particularly the caliber of law enforcement. Washingtonians have no say in the selection of their own dogcatcher, much less in the choice of their city administrators or their national government. The Capital is nominally governed by three Commissioners appointed by the President—two civilians and one Army Engineer. Often these jobs are roosts for party workers or campaign contributors. All actual governmental power is reserved by Congress.

Some five years ago the Washington Pont exposed a dishonest system of crime reporting in the police department. Certain complaints were “pocketed,” thus making crime statistics appear more favorable than they really were. When this situation was corrected, it was found that Washington led the United States in the number of aggravated assaults. Following up this sign of police laxness, the United States Attorney General charged that organized gambling under the nose of Congress was a $100 million a year business.

Several congressional committees purported to investigate law enforcement but found nothing wrong. City government heads showed not even this interest. Then, last summer, the Kefauver Committee uncovered a multimillion-dollar numbers racket. Federal grand jury and court action led to numerous convictions — and disclosed a trail into the police department. For the first time, a congressional committee got mad. The Senate District Crime Subcommittee put an expert staff to work and the results were shocking.

Testimony indicated that the head of the police narcotics squad had been taking pay-offs; that policemen had been instructed to “lay off” gambling arrests; that the head of the police auto squad had been gray-marketing in cars. Then, through the use of a financial questionnaire, the subcommittee found that four top officials of the department could not account for some $56,000 in personal income and expenditures. One of these was the former police chief, who retired for “ill health” after at first defying the questionnaire. He refused to testily about $17,400 not explained by his questionnaire.

All this has caused a mild consternation among Washington citizens. There is a new set of District Commissioners and a new police chief; the department now has a code of ethics and there are many promises of vigorous action against wrongdoers. But there has not been the slightest indication that the White House is concerned, and members of Congress are no more receptive than formerly to the proposal for District home rule.

Truman tosses the ball to Congress

President Truman’s plea for Congress to assume responsibility in the steel strike was clever politics.

Mr, Truman knew that there was liltle possibility that the legislators would grant him the new seizure power he requested. His criticism of the Taft-Hartley Law sounded like the cry of Br’er Rabbit: “Please don’t throw me into that briar patch!” If the injunction procedure under Taft-Hartley was to be used, the President wanted Congress to make the decision. The reason for this was simple: Taft-Hartley is still anathema to labor, and Mr. Truman wished to avoid any censure he might invite by invoking it. Actually, of course, the responsibility for execution of the law belongs to the President, not to Congress. To many legislators Mr. Truman’s contortion looked like an effort merely to spread the poison ivy.

The 6 to 3 Supreme Court decision outlawing the President’s original seizure order naturally enough delighted the steel companies. There was also a feeling of deep relief in many parts of the Administration. Many of Mr. Truman’s own associates felt that the President had taken bad advice and was out on the end of a very long limb.

Even officials of the CIO United Steelworkers privately were not unhappy over the decision. As the steel impasse dragged on, union leaders themselves acknowledged that the Wage Stabilization Board had gone beyond the bounds of public acceptance in its recommendations.

The Court decision itself found the best, legal minds siding with the majority. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court made two direct points: that Congress, with exclusive authority to make laws, had specifically rejected an amendment to authorize emergency seizure by the government when it passed the Taft-Hartley Law, and that the President’s order followed a presidential policy rather than existing law.

Yet the Court was careful not to tie the President’s hands against a future emergency. Justice Burton noted that the Court was not passing on what the President’s powers would be in the case of an enemy invasion. And Justice Frankfurter, in a strong argument against binding the future, called for meeting the issue without attempting to define the President’s powers precisely for all time.