The Philippines

on the World Today

THE political and economic future of the Philippine Republic is still a matter of deep concern to Americans as well as to Filipinos. For in this case there can be no excuse if the hope of democracy vanishes in economic collapse. Except for the interlude of Japanese occupation, we have had half a century in which to develop democratic ideas and practices, and since the war we have poured into the Islands over 2 billion dollars’ worth of aid.

The Philippines do not have to maintain the crushing burden of rearmament; there is no immediate threat of invasion; and the security of the republic is generally understood to be a responsibility shared with the Failed States. There are few areas in the world where our pride and our record are more deeply involved. If the free world fails here, it fails indeed.

Democratic development in the Philippines, most Filipinos would assume, is bound up with economic stability. The American view goes even further and argues that the future of democracy is bound up with a greater measure of social and economic justice. Although this attitude is encouraged by the challenge of Communism, it is also part of the American tradition. Hence the pressure of the Mutual Security Agency (formerly ECA) in the Philippines to bring about not only a great increase in industrialization but also a radical reform of the agrarian system.

As recently as 1950, both Filipino and American officials thought that the Philippines were facing imminent economic disaster. The legacy of the war was enough to discourage anyone. The problem of repairing the vast physical destruction was not so serious as that of overcoming open and unchecked corruption in public life. In the struggle against the Japanese, social vices became social virtues. The youth of the country grew accustomed to stealing, cheating, and killing as a daily occupation. When independence was celebrated, the moral tone of the country had never been lower.

It is fortunate for the Philippines that the Hukbalahaps, who only a few years ago were terrorizing the countryside even to the gates of Manila, were unable to capitalize on an opportunity which has passed, at least for the time being.

The relative weakness of the Philippine Communist movement is only one of the reasons that the situation has improved. The Korean war, which led to large-scale purchases of raw materials by the United States, gave a lift to the Philippine economy, which depends largely on exports. Even without a truce in Korea, heavy American buying is already tapering off. But at least it provided a breathing spell for the Philippine government.

A plow for a gun

The more substantial reasons for hope of improvement are twofold. One is the government’s seizure of the political initiative against the Hukbalahaps. The other is the Filipino-American coöperation through the Mutual Security Agency in the economic development of the country. In September, 1950, Ramón Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of Defense and given authority to clean up the armed forces of the Philippines. In spite of powerful opposition, he removed the Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Philippine Constabulary. Many senior officers were removed and some were brought to trial.

Magsaysay’s vigorous and relentless interest in the work and conditions of officers and men brought about a measurable improvement in the morale and confidence of the armed forces. But the real quality of the man is reflected best in his methods of fighting the Hukbalahaps. He has used a combination of military force and psychological warfare to great effect. He first of all improved the discipline of his own troops so successfully that the peasants, instead of fearing them as much as they did the Huks, came to trust, respect, and ultimately to assist the national forces.

By armed force Magsaysay broke up the Hukbalahaps into scattered units. By offering good treatment to those who surrendered and land to those who wanted it, he succeeded in getting a considerable number to surrender. Peasants who turned in arms and information about the Huks were rewarded and protected. The Army even stepped in to assist tenants in legal battles, the propaganda slogan, “A plow for a gun,”hits at one of the basic Communist appeals.

The psychological appeal is successful so long as it is based on facts. Magsaysay has found and is attempting to apply the most successful formula against Communism yet used in Asia. It is difficult to exaggerate the courage and insight with which the Secretary of Defense has gone about this task, but in the long run success will depend upon his ability to deliver on his promises.

He can control his own troops, ensure their good behavior with the peasants. He can treat his prisoners well and sec that justice takes its course. But can he always deliver a plow for a gun? Can he and his government bring about a substantial improvement in the condition of the agricultural laborers and dissatisfied farmers from whom the Communists recruit their support;

If he cannot, then his program — however well conceived and executed — can never in the end succeed. To quote Magsaysay himself, “Even if we lick the links now, unless the land is redivided and owned by the men who farm it, we will have the Huk problem all over again in three years — and it will be worse.”

How to make more land accessible

What are the prospects for solving the land problem? The facts are not very encouraging. The potentially productive agricultural area is a little under 10 million hectares. Over 5 million hectares are now cultivated, leaving between 4 and 5 million hectares to be brought under cultivation.

Here the difficulties begin. It is apparently not possible to survey more than 200,000 hectares a year, which does not keep pace with the number of families that should be settled every year. Magsaysay has actually settled only two or three hundred families in Mindanao. The Mutual Security Agency has assigned the money for the building of roads, which are necessary for gaining access to land as well as for clearing it; but no one supposes that it is possible to keep up with the increase of land-hungry peasants. In the last twenty years the population of Mindanao has increased from around 2 million to 3 million.

The land problem in the Philippines is as complex as any in Asia. The farms produce no more rice today than they did at the end of the First World War. Food production has certainly not kept up with increase in population, and the Philippines are a rice-importing country. We have to share the blame for the lack of improvement in farming methods. There are few Filipino farmers who know how to rotate crops, use fertilizer, select seeds, or control diseases. On Luzon, the size of the average farm is about 2 hectares. As in China and Japan, small farms, backward methods, and incredibly low family incomes go together. This means that most families are in the hands of the moneylenders.

The existence of large numbers of agricultural workers without land does not of itself necessarily produce social unrest. Where methods are modern and conditions of tenancy are reasonable, it is not necessary for a farmer to own land in order to make a good living. But in most Asiatic countries, and certainly in the Philippines, the fact that millions of farm workers do not own their land is a guarantee of social unrest. The unprotected farmer is squeezed between greedy landlords and rut bless moneylenders.

The rich get richer

The distribution of wealth and income in the Philippines must give considerable encouragement to the Philippine Communist Party. It is estimated that less than 5 per cent of the total population owns or controls most of the wealth. The contrast between rich and poor is certainly there for all to see. The poor are well aware that there has been a marked rise in the Philippine standard of living for the rich. For this awareness we are largely responsible— partly through the development of literacy, which exposes the Filipino to advertising, and partly through the impact of the American Army during the last war. In other words, we have increased the level of expectation without increasing the means to satisfy it. Such a situation is always explosive.

Magsaysay has made some dramatic moves. As we have indicated, however, he does not himself control all the factors necessary for success. The decisive factor is more likely to be the program of economic planning and development for which the Mutual Security Agency is the most important single instrument. The basic philosophy of the MSA is to use American aid as a strategic investment fund to increase productivity and to raise the economic level of lower income groups.

The planning itself requires the closest integration of political, economic, and military viewpoints, both U.S. and Philippine. Implementation demands the wholehearted coöperation of the Philippine Congress and Administration. In this last connection, the sixty or more American experts scattered through government departments operate as technicians and also as missionaries. The Philippine Islands are rich in resources and manpower; there is no excuse for the ever increasing unemployment and underemployment. The MSA program, as constituted today, may very well achieve the objectives of increasing productivity and raising the economic level of lower income groups. But unless there is a corresponding development of industry, the economic level of the few will be raised at the expense of the many. Improvement of farming techniques means less, not more, employment.

Jobs must be found

There is no indication that there is any significant increase in industrial employment opportunities. For purely political reasons, if for no other, jobs must be found. The reluctance of the dominant economic interests — the commercial and landowning classes — to assist in bringing about changes which might endanger their wealth and position must be overcome. It is no secret that there is as yet hardly any prospect of serious land reform, and the minimum-wage law is honored more in the breach than in the observance. Yet it is difficult to see how there can be any great increase in agricultural productivity or large-scale industrial development unless the social patterns of the Philippines undergo enormous changes.

Many of these patterns have parallels in other parts of Asia — for example, China, where the cure has been worse than the disease. The Chinese Communists have broken down the Chinese family system, the kinship group, the landlord-tenant relation, the tradition of investing in land — all of which stood in the way of industrialization.

In the Philippines, there is still hope of a democratic solution. For, unlike China, the Philippines have democratic institutions and have had at least one clean national election. It is possible, therefore, that the combination of American pressure from without and democratic pressure from below may break down the barriers that now Stand in the way of a united and prosperous republic.