Ten Years From Now

by JOHN J. McCLOY

1

I SHOULD like to speak to you quite prosaically about some of the things which are on my mind these days — things which crowd in upon me as I go through the process of readjusting myself to life in a business community after a considerable period of rather intensive living and working in what is vaguely known as “ the government.” At the risk of only repainting a picture with which you are already familiar, I shall sketch the slate of things, at least, as I see them, in the world today, with perhaps an attempt to foresee the world as it may be, let’s say, a short ten years from now when you who are students here and those of similar vintage elsewhere will be active participants in our national life.

Uppermost in my mind is the significance of the enormous change which has occurred in this nation and its relative standing in the world, and as a corollary the demands which this change places upon our behavior. A consideration of the developments which can be measured by the lifetime of one man is a graphic way of depict ing the contrast. Not long ago a striking character under whom I served in the First World War died in California. When I first went to the War Department and joined Secretary Stimson in the summer of 1940, this old soldier, who was also a philosopher and a wit, undertook to send me from time to time brief handwritten notes on how the war should be Conducted. He was then bedridden but qualified to give me spiritual advice because, as he put it, he was so “damned near dead he was communing with the angels.” He communed for some time, however, as he died only within the past year. Yet this individual had actually fought the Sioux Indians on our Western plains and had been cited for gallant behavior at the Bat the of Wounded Knee — so short is the span of our history. He and his contemporaries were still being painted by Frederic Remington, and Arnericans were living largely under the protection of the British fleet, when he was serving in the old cavalry posts which once dotted the West.

In so far as world affairs were concerned, the United States was decidedly a negalive quantity at that time. Great Britain then and for a considerable period thereafter did not feel that Washington was entitled to any higher representation than that, of a legation. At a much later date Woodrow Wilson, who was to lead us in our first great European adventure, could make a long inaugural address, as Professor Commager has pointed out, without one reference in if to foreign affairs.

Today our Army, Navy, and Air Force are based in Europe and in Asia, and any thought of their withdrawal from their bases at this time would produce untold confusion and danger. I do not need to give you any figures to prove how vast is our influence on the economy of other nations, how intertwined we have become in the affairs of all the world. It is difficult to think of any nation in which we do not have some interest or on which our economy or our policy does not exert some influence. Certainly this change has not brought ease of mind, and if we had the choice, we might even wish to go back to that simple, untaxed, untelevised, uninvolved life which was the pattern of these United States in the early part of this century.

The other great phenomenon is the emergence of Russia as a world power. I am sure that many, perhaps most of you, have read or heard of Tocqueville’s prophecy regarding the United States and Russia. One hundred years ago this astute Frenchman discerned the gathering strength of these two nations, each then developing steadily in the backwaters of history, destined, as he put it, “by a hidden purpose of Providence to hold in its hand one day the destinies of half mankind.” Now in all their might and power they face each other in many portions of the globe.

It is not the first time that great nations have squared off against each other. In the nineteenth century Great Britain was faced with a similar challenge during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, but today things are so much more complex and the power to destroy so infinitely more vast that it is probably futile to draw on historical analogies for guidance. Only recently the public as a whole was told of the thermonuclear explosion which took place in the Pacific last year. A sizable atoll completely disappeared and the seas were parted by a force the extent of which could not be adequately measured because the instruments set up for the purpose disintegrated. The newspapers advise us of a new series of explosions already under way which will probably be reported as having done even more sensational things.

It is now clear that both we and the Russians have planes capable of transporting these weapons of destruction across the continents, and I would guess that in, say, five years we both will have developed guided missiles to such a degree that they will be able to reach from continent to continent, delivering thermonuclear blows and creating devastation from which recovery would be conjectural. I fear it is rapidly becoming only a matter of ballistics. At this point I cannot help referring to something Professor Einstein is reported to have said in answer to a question as to what weapons would be used in World War Ill: “I cannot say with any precision but I can be precise about the weapons of World War IV. They will be rocks.” And with all this indescribably destructive power, there is also working up between us and the Russians a most serious political antagonism.

There are brush fires raging around the world now, and with the dry nature of the political atmosphere it is not certain that they can always be controlled. It would appear to be obvious in such a situation that we have need of friends and allies, but our unavoidable dependence upon them at the same time increases our involvements. Politically as well as strategically, we are committed so as to make it very likely indeed that we would be in the middle of things from the very start of a major blow-up. We have to remind ourselves that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization includes most of the Atlantic world, and our Pacific pacts cover a large part of the Asiatic world. Through NATO we relate our security to that of thirteen other countries, and we are obligated to defend West Germany and the city of Berlin should they be attacked. We have a pact with Japan; we have a pact for the defense of the Philippines, another for Korea, and another for Australia and New Zealand. For the time being it would appear that West Germany is stable in spite of the negative aspects of the Berlin Conference, where it was clearly disclosed that the Soviets are determined to sit on all of their present lines irrespective of the completely alien political, and even racial, character of the nationalities suppressed by them. But without unification and the settlement of the European Defense Community, it is a stability on which we cannot indefinitely rely.

I must confess that hard as it seems to find the solution to the German problem, it seems more readily soluble than does the snarl of Far Eastern problems. We have stopped the fighting in Korea but the Communists hold North Korea with a hand of iron. General Taylor has indicated that perhaps a million or so men could take North Korea, meanwhile heavily bombing the strategic and industrial centers north of the Yalu. In other words, unification of Korea could probably be achieved, but only by means of full-fledged war on the continent and with the likely employment of atomic warfare. This, apparently, Syngman Rhee would be prepared to risk, but it is not an appealing alternative even though the present situation is most unsatisfactory.

We recognize a deep strategic interest in Indochina, yet we are not prepared to send our troops there to help the French, who have already sacrificed much of their young manhood to keep the Communist forces from overwhelming the country. Yet if Indochina goes, the breadbasket of Japan goes, and much of what remains of the Far East moves into Communist hands; the Philippines are put in jeopardy, Australia becomes more isolated, and Indonesia, may slip away. And even if the Eisenhower Administration should undertake an expedition to Indochina as the Truman Administration did to Korea, is there any guarantee that the expedition would not have to stop short of complete victory?

As if these were not complications enough, what would be the attitude of India if we undertook such an expedition? Mr. Nehru seems not to like many of our policies as it is. As long as the Communist forces do not threaten his country from without, he wishes to remain aloof and combat Communism within his country. Asia for the Asians, for the moment at least, seems to be working better for the Russians than for the Western nations. Asiatics, oversensitive to the history of Western intrusion, at the same time seem undersensitive to the only imperialism which today has any reality — namely, the Russian.

Foci of infection are to be found in many places. Italy is uneasy; there is trouble in Africa, in Syria, in Egypt, in Guatemala, in Burma. Russia’s industrial potential is steadily increasing and her diplomacy is giving signs of becoming more subtle.

2

I COULD go on with this calamitous catalogue of serious problems and it would sound like Jeremiah’s lament, but here I will stop and remind you that ever since Jeremiah this has been a hard world, and the exactions imposed on the responsible leader are never light . It is part of a leader’s lot that his motives are frequently maligned, his good will misread, and his reserves strained. It is not particularly significant that we are encountering great difficulty in inducing nations of Western Europe to enter into defense arrangements which would appear to provide them as well as ourselves with maximum security. England, when she was attempting to hold Napoleon in check, had the utmost difficulty in maintaining any coalition. Nations popped in and out of alliance with her with the most disconcerting frequency. She scattered about Europe loans and subsidies of a most unbusinesslike character; yet through it all England maintained a steadiness of purpose and a continuity of policy which did secure her leadership and did give stability to Europe and a large part of the world.

The great question is whether we are prepared and equipped to play the even more exacting role which world leadership today involves. It is supremely necessary for us now to present to the world a picture of a composed, resolute, tolerant nation. We cannot afford to lose the respect and confidence of our friends. Above all, we cannot take the position that because we have a peek of troubles, in spite of the successful conclusion of a great war, we must have been betrayed. To be sure, there were spies and traitors among us — too many of them. There can be little doubt, I think, that the defection of certain scientists materially accelerated the Soviet development of the atom and hydrogen bombs, but the bulk of our problems would be with us today even if this were not so. There never was a triumph followed by the millennium. There never was a victory that did not quickly pose the problem of going forward.

Sir Winston Churchill, shortly after the first World War, pointed out that many, if not most, wars remain great catastrophes even in victory; for defeat, as he said, “has a habit of laying its heavy hand on victors as well as vanquished.” How true that has been after this war! We have had our share of problems, but this is not new; and because things are bad it is not always necessary or wise to blame somebody for it. It certainly is not wise when we should conserve our time, energy, and composure for the frightfully difficult task of guiding the free nations of the world safely through the dark channels of present world tension.

With all the deterioration our prestige has suffered since the victory — much of it natural and inevitable since it was built on utterly unrealistic hopes — we still have the capacity, the strength, and the traditions to exert the influential leadership the free world needs. This I truly believe, but we Americans are at a stage of responsibility where we all have to begin to act our age. If we do not, other peoples on whom we now and for the future depend will rightly lose their faith and confidence in our leadership, and it will be no comfort to us if with it they also lose their own capacity to stand against the pressures directed from the Kremlin.

Now do not mistake me. I do not feel that our foreign friends are always right and that we are usually wrong. I think we have had to endure a great deal of nonsense in the way of criticism from abroad. We do not need to squirm every time a member of Parliament takes a fling at us. It is not significant when some French poseur decries our culture. Much of the criticism may be merely petulant. With a full appreciation of all the great, sacrifices our friends have had to bear, and with all the understanding to which they are entitled, they can scarcely base their criticism on the hypothesis that they have been highly successful themselves in avoiding wars and catastrophes. It is only when we fall below our own standards that we need wince over some of the criticism. Moreover, it is my impression that it is precisely because our friends realize they have failed, and fear that with a all our greater strength and greater means we shall not do better than they have done, that they respond so sensitively to our eccentricities.

We cannot continue to moan over the loss of China or wring our hands over Yalta, serious as they were. Bad mistakes were made. Nor will it do to attempt to justify the mistakes as some do by protesting that Stalin gave very resounding assurances at the same time the concessions were made to him. It is well to recall that while Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill did rely on those assurances — which were not fulfilled — there was another factor underlying Yalta, and that was the presence of about 15 million fully armed and strategically placed Communists in the shape of the Red Army. And it was this factor that had not a little to do with the decisions that were taken at the close of the war. But we shall get nowhere dwelling on the past, particularly when it is so important to build our strength, set our policies, and increase our knowledge so that we shall be well prepared to meet the challenges which are certain to crowd in upon us as we strive to maintain an honorable peace.

3

I HAVE said that I would attempt to sketch the world as it might be ten years hence. This is a large order but let me try to approach it in a rather roundabout way. There is a group in New York which has been studying, with the facilities of the Council on Foreign Relations, the problem of our relations with the Soviet Union, in the endeavor to find solutions, or at least develop attitudes which would, consistent with justice, produce peace. One of the members of the group came forward with a paper the other day and he labeled it “1964.”Here is how he began his paper: —

“It is September 1964. Today the situation in which the United States finds itself is so disheartening and the choice so discouraging that we may well ask ourselves how it could have happened that in the course of less than a decade we have turned from a mighty world power into an isolated island surrounded by an all-engulfing Communist Red Sea.”

It was this man’s way of pointing up the need for maintaining our alliances and of binding the free world together; and as he reviewed the steps by which, according to his hypothesis, we arrived at this grim situation in the world, he startled everyone by the thought of how easily momentum might develop in this direction. The descent to Avernus looked alarmingly easy. The group, which is composed of former public servants, ambassadors, atomic scientists, business and financial leaders, and Russian experts, had their thoughts sharply stimulated by this approach to the problem, and no one left the meeting without thinking deeply of both the danger and the remedy.

The group, I am glad to say, was not prepared to accept this pessimistic hypothesis. The feeling was that we would be alert and sensible enough to take, in good time, constructive measures to check any serious trend in this direction. But all agreed that as a prerequisite we had to provide the world with an example of our good sense, our balance, our wisdom, and our capacity to carry out our role of world leader. All felt that the free nations of the world did not doubt our fundamental good will or, in the light of our record, our generosity or our strength; but all likewise agreed there was a growing doubt of our wisdom and of our capacity to provide the guidance without which the other free nations, as well as we, would be in serious trouble.

As to my own view of what the world will be like in 1964, I simply say I do not know. All I feel certain of is that it will not be easy. The rest is guesswork. I must confess I can foresee no great change in Soviet attitudes, though in the long run I do not completely despair of it. I would guess that in 1964 we shall still find it necessary to maintain a great military establishment ; we shall probably still be combating Soviet efforts to introduce a Moscow-controlled statism throughout the world. Certainly it will still be necessary to employ the highest form of statesmanship in order to maintain our position and that of the free nations. It seems likely, in spite of tensions, that both we and the Europeans will be trading more with the Soviets. This may bring about some easing of relations, but I think we would be foolish to base our policy on the likelihood of an abandonment of Soviet determination to dominate Europe and Asia. We shall probably still be combating Soviet attempts to infiltrate and to make all non-Communist countries suspicious and distrustful of each other, but I hope and believe we shall be a whole lot more sensible, a whole lot less hysterical, and therefore a whole lot more efficient in blunting these efforts than we are today.

I firmly believe that what the situation in 1964 will be depends more on us than on the Soviets. We can by our conduct deeply influence the thinking and tendencies of the large areas of the world which are either allied with us or are still free of Communist control; and as they are influenced, so in a subtle, slow, unpredictable way the thinking of the Kremlin and its decisions regarding war and peace may be influenced. We shall have to keep our eyes and mind on the main issues. Serious as Communist infiltrations into our government have been, there are far more difficult and dangerous Communist threats we have to meet. It is supremely important, at this very windy corner of history, that we form a constructive, affirmative, and flexible foreign policy, uninfluenced by fear and suspicion generated among ourselves. One more thing of which we can be sure is that in 1964 the United States will still be a dynamic country and, barring war, we shall still be progressing. And if we are as enlightened and courageous as we are capable of being, we shall still be enjoying an honorable peace.

4

A PROPOS of this matter of Communists in government, let me make a digression. During the 1930s I was a practicing lawyer and my firm was involved from time to time in the Congressional investigations of those days. There were excesses and practices current at the time which no doubt required investigation, just as investigation into the matter of Communist infiltration may be necessary now, but many of us can recall the shameful abuses of the investigative process which then took place. Witnesses’ rights were abused and utterly one-sided reports were concocted by the biased lawyers of the committees.

At that time little was heard from the liberals, the academicians, or the intellectuals in protest against the abuse of the businessmen’s rights. It was only when the investigations turned on the schools and universities, in disregard of both objectivity and the rights of individuals, that this group became both concerned and articulate. And to cap il all, just the other day a good friend of mine, a former major general, who had been taking strong issue wilh me over my criticism of certain current investigative procedures, called me. He was breathing fiery indignation over the way another general had just been handled in a Congressional investigation. How long must it take before we realize that liberty does not depend upon whose ox is gored? “Send not to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

Recently there has been staying with us in New York a German woman, whose name I will not mention even though she is readily identifiable. She fell it necessary to object to the way things were going in Germany in the Hitler period and soon found herself in jail. Her cell was next to that of Helmuth von Moltke, whose record in the Resistance, if you do not know it, you should take the pains to learn. In due course he was strangled and she was condemned to death. While she was being transferred to the prison where the executions took place, one of our air raids on Berlin occurred and the driver of the prison van permitted the few prisoners to take shelter while the raid was on. By the flashes of the explosives she spied a bicycle standing in front of one of the houses in the street. She watched for her chance between the flashes, grabbed the bike, rode off, and then remained underground until the surrender.

The other night she was telling of conversations die had had with von Moltke by means of surreptitious whispering between the cells. Never able to see him, she could only hear him. He constantly made the point that individuals or demagogues from time to time appear and abuse the power they achieve. This happens in every nation. What distinguishes the more enlightened nations from the others, according to von Moltke, is how the privileged elements of society react to such abuse. And by “privileged" he meant primarily the educated and the successful. That is the test of a country’s fiber. In a healthy society, protection of liberty and the maintenance of decent public administration must be stimulated and guarded from the top. If the privileged groups grow lethargic, indifferent, apologetic, or fearful, the danger signals are up and the consequences can become disastrous.

We are not in any serious danger of a Nazi revolution in this country in spite of some superficial appearances, but we are in great danger of failing to fulfill both our potentialities and our obligations as an exceptionally privileged member of the community of free nations.

I can give you an example of how youth responds to such messages as von Moltke’s. In Berlin we used frequently to invite students from the Free University to come to the house to talk, to eat, to exchange views. Forty per cent of these students had escaped from Commmunist-controlled Fast Germany to study at the Fniversity where truth —• and not the Communist version of truth— was taught. The old Berlin University—the one in which Humboldt taught and established the principle of uninfluenced research — is in the Russian sector of Berlin and it has become largely a propaganda institute.

The average student in the Free University lived on $20 a month. From this he had to pay his tuition, his board, his room rent, and provide his own clothing. (Needless to say, the clothing was threadbare.) These students would steal across the border into the East Zone, carrying news back and forth across the barriers, it was due to the zeal of these young people and some of their teachers that the Free University in Berlin was founded, it you would look today lor the disciples of the Humboldt tradition, it would be here and not at the foot of Filter den Linden that you would find them. I am glad to say that the Americans have made large contributions to the University so as to give these students buildings in which to eat and live and study.

Now certainly we in this country do not have iron curtains or barriers across our streets; nor are there Russian tanks at which students might throw stones; but you can be sure that sooner or later in your careers your adherence to truth and freedom will be put to a test, and I hope for your snkes it will be a less exacting one.

One of our former very distinguished foreign service officers recently said that he could not recommend that young people go into the foreign service today, because of the demoralization which has set in as a result of excessive and unintelligent measures to improve the so-called security of the State Department. With all due respect and with a full understanding of the seriousness of the situation which he described. I believe he was shortsighted. Unpleasant and serious as this condition of affairs may be, it is temporary and in the long view unimportant. In spite of all the hesitation, all the holding back; in spite of all the wishing that things might be otherwise, it is inevitable that during the next hundred years ibis country will take an active, vigorous, and contributing part in world affairs. It is a participation that will grow rather than recede, and it will challenge our ablest talents.

Emerson, who lived not far from here, once said: “Each man is a cause, a country and an age,”meaning that each of us, young and old, must act as if his action determined the lives of all of us. My hero-statesman Henry L. Stimson, who once attended this Academy, fulfilled this definition, and Phillips Academy will produce more like him.

The country so needs men and women with knowledge, with character, with strength, and with vision— people who are aware of the deep significance of the problems wc face, people who can foresee the great developments of this dangerous but challenging world — that there can be no holding back. Those who have gone through the war and helped in the victory may not have done too well, but one of the great thoughts that Stimson left to those who follow was contained in his noble postscript to On Active Service in Peace and JI’ar: “Let them charge us with our failures and do better in their turn. But let them not turn aside from what they have to do nor think that criticism excuses inaction.”