Bonn

DR. KONRAD ADENAUER’S name has been almost continuously in the news for the last ten years. Yet it has never before dominated the political scene in Bonn in quite the same way as it has during the last few months. Two decisions which he made — on each occasion, in his own words, “after mature reflection”—can truly be described as momentous. On April 7, he announced that he would give up the chancellorship in September and stand as Christian Democratic presidential candidate on July 1. On June 5, he exactly reversed this decision; he would not stand for the presidency, and he would remain Chancellor.

On the morning of June 4, Adenauer was still his own party’s official candidate for the presidency. Only two days earlier he had said goodby to his minister of economics, Ludwig Erhard, as the latter set off for a visit to Washington — a part of the political grooming process deemed necessary for the most obvious choice as Adenauer’s successor in the chancellorship. No word did Adenauer breathe to him of any impending change of plan.

On June 4. Adenauer made up his mind to force a decision on a minor issue on which he happened to feel strongly, it had still not been decided whether the presidential election should be held in Berlin, Bonn, or elsewhere. Last October, when the Federal President. Theodor Heuss. made it plain that there could be no question of his standing for a third term, the Bundestag opted in principle for Berlin.

The president of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, regarded this Bundestag declaration as binding. Adenauer did not; he has always had an aversion to heathen, evangelical, Middle-European Berlin. For one thing, it never belonged to Charlemagne’s Empire. For another, its broad, hedonistic cosmopolitanism is out of step with the Rhineland’s “little Europeanism,”which does not look beyond the English Channel or the River Elbe. Berlin has a Social Democratic government. Adenauer visualized a presidential election going wrong in Berlin. He has never been popular there, and the atmosphere could have favored his hedonistic, cosmopolitan. Social Democratic opponent, Carlo Schmid. He decided that the elections should be in Bonn, just as—ten years earlier— he had decided that the Federal capital should be there and not in left-wing, liberal Frankfurt am Main.

German life is largely ruled by dogmas. The symbolic importance of Berlin is one of them. Adenauer informed Gerstcnmaier that the Western powers—France, the United States, and Britain — had objected to the choice of Berlin because international discussion of the Berlin problem was under way at Geneva and some concession should be made to Soviet susceptibilities.

Gerstcnmaier promptly got in touch with the Western embassies in Bonn. He was told that the Western governments had not objected specifically to the holding of an election in Berlin. They had indicated to the Federal foreign minister, Heinrich von Brentano, that it might have repercussions but that the matter was one to be decided by the Germans themselves and nobody else. Gerstenmaier then asked Adenauer for the meaning of his ruse (it was plain enough — the other Western powers and not the Federal government were to bear responsibility for the election’s not being held in Berlin).

Nothing is more annoying for a politician than to be caught out. Later in the day on June 4. Adenauer blurted out to members of his party that he would not, after all, give up the leadership of the government. He officially confirmed this decision on the next day. The argument oxer Berlin had been, for him, the final straw.

Adenauer’s change of heart

What were the underlying reasons for a decision which raised a storm of opposition within the Christian Democratic Party, which plainly showed up Adenauer’s lack of regard for the office of President and his lack of confidence in his own party, and which has seriously damaged the Christian Democrats’ chances in the next Federal election in 1961? To answer this question it is necessary to go back to Adenauer’s iirst, no less surprising decision of April 7 to relinquish the chancellorship.

During the last winter Adenauer had two attacks of bronchitis and at least two severe colds. His family (seven sons and daughters and their wives and husbands) urged him to lead a less strenuous life. His closest advisers — the chancellery secretary of state, Hans Globke; the chairman of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group, Heinrich Krone; the Cologne banker, Robert Pferdemenges — seconded this view. To them the primary question was, could Konrad Adenauer, already aged eighty-three, govern for another two years and then lead his party to victory at the polls in 1961?

When Krone the elderly Figaro of the (Christian Democratic Party — broached the subject of retirement to Adenauer, he was instantly rebuffed. Krone sought the advice of the éminence grise of the chancellery, Globke. Together they evolved the correct approach to Adenauer.

The picture which Krone unfolded to him was an attractive one. He would have to retire .someday, that was sure; so it would be best to retire at his convenience and at a time when he could safeguard his inheritance. By standing for the Federal presidency he would ensure that this post did not fall into the hands of a Social Democrat —a backhanded argument, since the President is in any case meant to he politically neutral. A new Chancellor could be installed, nursed through two years in office, and then presented to the electorate in 1961 as the perfect teammate for the President.

And here Krone was able to add a touch of historical glamour: the duties of a President were not so arduous that Adenauer could not hold the post for two five-year terms — ten years as Chancellor, ten years as President, this indeed would provide that historical continuity in which Adenauer fervently believed. It would set the seal on the development of the Federal Republic as a constitutional, democratic state. It could, maybe, enable that state to provide a stable foundation for a reunified Germany.

The powers of the President

The appearance of resignation was deceptive. Adenauer’s first act was to instruct chancellery officials to examine meticulously every “interesting” clause of the Federal Constitution. Articles 59, 60, and 63 came under this heading. They suggested that Theodor Heuss had not exercised to the full his powers covering the signature of treaties, the appointment of high state officials, and the nomination of a new Chancellor. Quite openly, Adenauer stated that the duties of the presidency Were open to a “broader interpretation” — a remark which led Heuss to ask for an immediate interview. Others besides the Chancellor were pleased with the idea of a presidential democracy in which government would be steered and manipulated and a new Chancellor’s prerogatives would be cunningly curtailed by the “Old One.”

Adenauer came to believe that his right to nominate a new Chancellor in the Bundestag meant, in effect, that lie could choose him personally. Very quickly he found himself involved in a bitter struggle with his own Christian Democratic Party. The party wanted Ludwig Erhard, the popular, well-known, and successful minister of economics, as Chancellor. Adenauer wanted the minister of finance, Franz Etzel. Why? Etzel was a sound administrator but was virtually unknown at home and abroad. This was precisely what made him so acceptable to Adenauer. He was less independent, less popular than Erhard; he would be more easily controlled by the President.

The letter of the Constitution can be interpreted in different ways, but its spirit is generally plain. Its spirit is that a West German President should nominate as Chancellor someone acceptable to the majority of the Bundestag. The President should make sure that his nominee enjoys the required support in Parliament. But from the first, Adenauer intended to force his choice on his party. The tug of war was on.

The Christian Democratic Party saw no reason to go back on its choice of Erhard. Apart from Adenauer, he was the one truly national figure in Western Germany. He was the symbol of the material prosperity which rules German everyday life. He would be the talisman of success in the 1961 election. Whether he would make an outstandingly good Chancellor seemed immaterial. He would avoid political adventures, strengthen friendships with the West, play safe.

For fifty-nine days the party stood firm. The majority of its members believed they could outstay Adenauer. They were wrong. The plain fact was that Adenauer was furiously disappointed both by his tailure to make Etzel his successor and by the constitutional limitations of the President’s office.

The political overtones

The chancellorship crisis will be important in German history because of the lessons it taught. It has shown that German political parties are still too easily dominated by a single man. The Führer complex of the Christian Democratic members of the Bundestag prevented their showing strong opinions of their own and allowed Adenauer to press them relentlessly. The sense of political responsibility has to be more widely spread in Germany.

In the second place, the crisis showed that the German public remains as nonpolitical as it was twenty-live years ago. Extensive sounding of individual views by German newspapers indicated that the man in the street still regarded politics as something which is essentially for politicians. The usual answer to the question “Has the Chancellor done the right thing or not?" was: “The Chancellor ought to know — that is what he is there for.”West German democracy is only ten years old; the man in the street must not be blamed if he does not yet feel politically adult.

More disturbing was the lack of respect shown for constitutional forms. Adenauer would have become President if he could have expanded the presidential powers. The choice of the new President was looked upon as a strictly party affair, and even the choice of a city for the election became a party issue. As the lines were drawn, Adenauer’s resistance stiffened. He went alongwith the nomination of a virtual unknown, Dr. Heinrich Luebke, minister of agriculture since 1953, for President. Hut his personal feud with Erhard made headlines when he publicly questioned Erhard’s qualifications to succeed him as Chancellor. When the foreign ministers’ conference recessed, Adenauer lost one of his reasons for opposing the choice of Berlin for the election, and the party quickly outvoted him. As a result oi his intransigency, his reputation and that of his party suffered.

Prosperity era

The average West German citizens have continued to go about their business of working, earning, and enjoying the increasing comforts of life which they can afford. For the materially-minded this era has many of the qualities of the millennium. The national income rose by 6 per cent last year. There arc so many more cars on the roads that fatal accidents are now seven times more frequent than in Britain, twelve times more frequent than in the United States (68 deaths per 10,000 vehicles, against 9 in Britain and 5.7 in the United States).

Retail sales rocket with an unchecked momentum. Ownership of TV sets has doubled in one year. West German aircraft are on the world market again. The Germans are lending and investing abroad, from the now bulging resources of their once threadbare capital market. The 1958 wine harvest has turned out to be a record for all time. The birth rate is going up.

The man in the street has had his fill of wars, inflations, crises in the past. Who should blame him if dramatic political overtones extract no more than a shrug from him? Or if his gaze is increasingly focused just ahead of the tip of his own nose?