Latin America

ON THE WORLD TODAY

BOLIVIA has entered the war. And one hears an increasing amount of talk about sending troops from some of our belligerent Latin American allies to the actual fighting fronts. One also hears of rising opposition to such a plan in certain military circles in Washington. A showdown has come nearer in our relations — or non-relations — with the Vichy-controlled French colony of Martinique in the West Indies. There are stirrings in Argentina.

Along with the visits of President Roosevelt to Mexico and of Vice President Wallace to Central America and the South American west coast republics, these have been the principal developments on the inter-American front during the recent period. They are unusually significant developments, and they merit analysis.

Bolivia acts

Begin with Bolivia. Quite frankly the war declaration at La Paz at the beginning of April took Washington by surprise. It was like an unexpected Christmas present. Bolivia had certainly not been urged to assume formal belligerency either from military or from diplomatic quarters of the United Nations. So few advance intimations of the declaration had been given that it had almost the air of a special courtesy to Vice President Wallace on his visit to the republic. Among some of the more nervous branches of our various intelligence services the action produced the symptoms of mild heartburn. It is upsetting to be taken by surprise.

And Chile wonders

Some influential sections of the Chilean press were annoyed by the declaration and complained that it might lead to the sinking by the Axis of Chilean ships, which carry considerable quantities of Bolivia’s war materials to the United States. Such vital actions, the Chileans objected, should only be decided upon by the South American nations in concert and after due consultation between their governments.

There were also a few military jitters in Washington. The Axis and its agents are still fairly active in Bolivia — a huge republic under somewhat feeble administrative control. So the worry arose in the military mind as to whether, if the new belligerent were taken in on any of the military secrets of the Allies, the Axis might not gain more from the declaration than the United Nations would.

Pass the ammunition

Actually, Bolivia’s action so far has failed to produce any lurid embarrassments, and appears to have been most closely related to domestic politics. With a difficult mine labor situation on its hands, the La Paz government apparently felt that belligerency would increase its powers to deal with possible future emergencies. Furthermore, ever since its Chaco war with Paraguay in the 1930’s, Bolivia has been concerned about its military and political power.

Consequently, seeing that most of the fully belligerent American republics were getting some military supplies and fighting equipment from the United States, the La Paz government doubtless reasoned that a declaration of war against the Axis was a good gamble to increase its military stores. Finally, President Peñaranda was scheduled to visit President Roosevelt in Washington and there was something to be said for being received as a full belligerent.

Soldiers want to fight

Bolivia, of course, is not involved at present in the question of sending troops from belligerent Latin American nations to the fighting areas. But there are growing demands for this kind of action from authoritative elements in the Brazilian government, and from Cuba. Even in Mexico, where the government originally made official announcements that no expeditionary forces were contemplated, there is some popular demand for more active participation.

But there is little likelihood of the use of any sizable bodies of Latin American troops in the overseas fighting areas at present. The objections come from high military quarters in the United Nations.

They are mainly on the score of efficient war management, and they are strong. It is not a question of the fighting quality of the troops. The main considerations are that even the largest Latin American armies, like the Brazilian and the Mexican, are relatively less trained in the use of full modern war equipment than the armies of the Allies bearing the brunt of the fighting. And since there is not enough equipment — or enough shipping — to supply them in the near future, they are not likely to have this final training for a long time to come.

Military opinion holds that our limited shipping facilities must be applied with the greatest possible efficiency. And there cannot be the same fighting efficiency in the same space on a military transport if we send a Latin American soldier to the front as there is when we send a trained soldier from one of the nations already fighting.

New armies of occupation

Meanwhile, there is a more reasonable chance that Latin American troops may be used within a few months as occupation forces for tropical areas retaken from the Axis, either in Africa or in the South Pacific. On these military assignments there are good prospects that the equipment of the Latin American detachments would steadily be improved and their training intensified.

One of these assignments conceivably might be in Martinique, if drastic action should become necessary against the pro-Vichy regime of High Commissioner Admiral Georges Robert. But in spite of the complete diplomatic break which the State Department made with the Robert menage at the end of April, forcible seizure of Martinique and Guadeloupe in the French Antilles seems at this writing by no means a matter definitely scheduled.

United States air and naval reconnaissance makes it almost impossible for Admiral Robert to give any military aid to the Axis in Caribbean waters; and with this danger factor out., Washington policy — largely in deference to Latin American suspicions of Yankee “imperialism” — would prefer to avoid even justified aggressions anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, forcible occupation of the French islands by Latin American or any other brand of troops appears unlikely until every hope has been exhausted of inducing the people of the French islands to replace Admiral Robert with a pro-Giraud regime of their own accord.

The Argentine election

Argentine developments are increasingly dominated by the electoral struggle, and no doubt will continue to be until the election itself takes place in September. Recently the prospects of serious opposition to President Castillo’s candidate, Robustiano Patron Costas of the National Democratic Party, have grown brighter — but not bright enough to justify much hope that the Radical-Socialist coalition will elect the next Argentine president.

Nevertheless, the threat of serious opposition may be having the effect of diluting some of the 100 per cent isolationism of President Castillo and the National Democratic Party. For instance, in Buenos Aires for the past several weeks, Patron Costas, the Castillo administration’s “crown prince,” has gone out of his way on numerous private and semi-official occasions to express friendliness towards the United States and general emotional sympathy for the Allied cause.

Even more significant, perhaps, certain prominent Argentines visiting the United States recently have expressed to prominent official personages in Washington their confident predictions that the Patron Costas administration will positively break diplomatic ties with the Axis as soon as it takes office. Some of these assurances have been made on the basis of alleged interviews — private, of course, and quite unofficial — with Patron Costas himself.

As the cat jumps

The probabilities are, however, that Patron Costas’s foreign policy, after his election, wall depend on the course of the war. If the Allies appear badly stalemated in Europe and the South Pacific next autumn, quite possibly the group of Foreign Minister Ruiz Guiñazú will still be in the saddle in Buenos Aires and will continue to work away in the hope that there will be a negotiated peace, in which Argentina, as a leading negotiator, could cut herself in on some of the juiciest bargains.

On the other hand, by all these confidential — not to say irresponsible — messages of good cheer to the Allies, Patron Costas seems to be maneuvering himself into a position where he can jump for the United Nations bandwagon toward the close of the year if the seats look comfortable.

Argentina and Spain

Meanwhile, the Castillo government has recently made, with a notable public display of Hispanic emotions, a new cultural relations treaty with Franco, which should considerably facilitate the circulation of Franco’s pro-Axis propaganda in the republic. And Buenos Aires also seems on the point of receiving a new Spanish ambassador more orthodox in his fascist Falangist connections than the present mildly royalist envoy of Franco. But these gestures might turn out, in the end, to be valuable bargaining counters in any future political operations Patron Costas may be contemplating.