Hitler's Secret Records: Unpublished Stenographic Reports of Hitler's Talks With His Generals

Edited by FELIX GILBERT

ON Saturday, May 5, 1945, the 506th Parachute Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division occupied Berchtesgaden. Sergeant George Allen was prompt to open the Divisional Counter-Intelligence office and began the task of clearing the Nazi element out of the town’s local government. One of the first Germans to be interrogated for a posit ion in the new government was Herr Gerhard Herrgesell. He told Sgt. Allen that he had been a stenographer for the military conferences which had taken place twice daily at Hitler’s headquarters all through the war, and that he had been present at the last conference to be held with all the major figures present, on April 22, 1945. Having admitted that there were other members of the stenographic staff still in the neighborhood, Herrgesell was ordered to bring them to headquarters. On May 8 he presented himself with six of his colleagues, including Dr. Kurt Peschel, head of the stenographic service at Hitler’s headquarters, and Herr Buckholz, who had been present when the attempt was made on Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944.

In the course of this second interrogation, it was learned that shorthand reports of Hitler’s conferences with his generals had been begun in 1942; that they had been kept in triplicate; that the record filled over two hundred thousand pages; and that Hitler’s own copy of the minutes had been burned by SS troops in a pit they dug near the village of Hintersee, five miles from Berchtesgaden. Sgt. Allen with Herrgesell, Peschel, and Buckholz immediately drove out to sec the pit, where they found a mass of charred paper perhaps two feet deep. After digging about for a few minutes, Sgt. Allen came upon what Herrgesell told him was a complete stenographic original of a whole conference, then another, and then quite a few typescripts which had been charred around the edges. All in all, they were able to recover the remains of fiftytwo conferences, some complete, some consisting of only a few charred pages. Some of the fragments were in shorthand, still wrapped in their original manila envelopes; the rest, were typewritten copies and bore the word Führerkopie at the top of each first page.

The German stenographers were set to work making clear copies of what was still legible, and thus emerged some eight hundred typed pages covering the conferences from December, 1942, to March 23, 1945.

Of the three sets of minutes, the one which is said to have been left in Berlin in the German Army Archives may be presumed to have been wholly destroyed; another was completely burned by Brigadier General Walter Scherff, historian of the Oberkommande der Wehrmacht. It is therefore probable that the charred remains which Sgt. Allen recovered from the pit at Hintersee represent all that survives of an immensely important document of over two hundred thousand pages.

It is clear that the conferences consisted of two parts. In the first, usually held in the mornings, the staff reported on the situation on the Eastern and Western fronts, and the Air Force and Navy reported on their special fields. Hitler sat or stood at a table on which were spread the maps to illustrate each report. Then, after an intermission in which the officers refreshed themselves with drinks and a buffet lunch, there followed a more general and informal discussion led by Hilter. In these informal discussions. Hitler held the center of the stage and the generals were always careful to “yes” him into a good humor — unless the news was too bad. HITLER: I really must say that that huge Army of his must have had fuel to come back here from the El Alamein. They didn‘t do that on water. In all that time, they had practically no fuel. If they had brought up the fuel instead of going back for it, they could have operated out in front. There’s no doubt about that. Because it would have been simpler to operate in front with a couple of divisions. In the last analysis it is only the tanks and a little artillery. They’ve covered 1500 kilometers, taking along household goods and everything else they could get their hands on. Of the men we lost there, it is certain that 50 per cent were lost during the retreat, which means that the real losses up front

These stenographic records were begun in December, 1942, as the result of a dispute between Halder, the Army Chief of Staff, and Hitler. Haider was dismissed from office and henceforward Hitler, in complete control, was surrounded by generals who believed — or said they believed — in his military genius. He insisted that there should always be two (usually there were three) stenographers present. He gave less and less authority to field commanders and took more and more details upon himself. He believed increasingly that any suggested withdrawal or retreat was motivated by lack of courage and that his intuition, plus a more courageous attitude on the part of his subordinates, was sufficient for victory.

Morale, the full use of modern techniques, and the political considerations seemed more important, to him than to the more conventional professional soldiers. His point of view was upheld with great obstinacy; and while his ideas were effective when the war was going well, he clung to them when reverses made them ineffective or destructive. It cannot be said, however, that Hitler‘s amateur generalship showed intellectual feebleness. It was in some respects highly intelligent, but it was conceited, egotistic, and controlled by fixed ideas.

Hitler’s sentences were badly constructed and repetitive, and his language was extremely vulgar. Also it will he seen that he was mean in argument and amazingly ill informed on vital political and economic facts in connection with countries, such as the United States, with which he was personally unfamiliar. _ FELIX GILBERT

ROMMEL‘S RETREAT

December 12, 1942. This conference lasted from 12.45 P.M. until 3 P.M.

PARTICIPANTS ; Hitler, Bodenschatz, Buhle, Christian, Hensinger, Hard, Jodl, Krancke, Warlimont, and Zeitzler.

After a very long and detailed discussion of the military situation at velikie Luki and Stalingrad, Jodl launches his report on the African theater. He refers to Rommel‘s retreat from the position before El Agheila, which the British 8th Army was preparing to attack both from the front and by a flanking movement from the south.

HITLER: I’ve received another report saying that there is a retreat in progress here.

JODL: Yes, that’s right. There is no doubt that the enemy has begun his first major attack here, which he probably wants to continue on the 13th. Our air reconnaissance confirms that he had his air force ready, and that he had moved his bases up. He has his main fighter group, with 130 singleengined and 120 twin-engined planes, in the area north of Agedabia, plus 100 single-engined and 40 twin-engined planes in the area between Sollum and Marina. In addition, the total number of intercepted radio messages indicates that his condition is just as it was before the El Ahunein offensive, and he is now ready to attack here. The Air Chief Africa is also of the opinion that the English offensive aimed at Tripoli will commence within the next few days. Our own forces are weak in comparison as long as the main body is in Sicily. Essentially they are too far away from the final position.

HITLER: Who said that that was the final posit ion ?

JODL: The Duce has given that order.

HITLER: The conference which the Rcichsmarschall had wasn‘t that clear.¹

JODL: Rommel says the same thing in his telegram.

HITLER: What does he say?

JODL: He says: “Troops in the area. . . . will be drawn back into the final position.” There is the word “final.” So the over-all situation allowed him to count on that.

Now to continue: Although he repulsed all attacks yesterday, including those from the south, Rommel says that the attacks will doubtless be continued here today, and that he can‘t afford an engagement which would use up his fighting strength, particularly since the enemy attacks also from the south, though with weak forces. His fuel situation is such that he can‘t conduct offensive and mobile operations, but was just able to withdraw into this position. He has to stay here until the 15th, so that he will be mobile again. Therefore he can‘t commit himself to anything. Considering the fuel situation, that‘s understandable. If he were mobile, if he could drive around the wav he wants, he could slip out of any encirclement.

Were probably extraordinarily low. There is no doubt that the failure to push through the first offensive under the impact of the sinking of the 4000-ton steamer was wrong.² That‘s the impression Lessening had, as well as Ramcke, who said: we “” cannot understand why we didn’t get further, the English were in complete rout; all we would have had to do was to drive on and to push in from some flank.”

But I really think one shouldn‘t leave a man in a position of such heavy responsibility too long. That gradually demoralizes his nerves.... It’s better to relieve him. Then someone comes in fresh, who wants to earn his laurels and is relatively fresher. I am therefore determined that, as soon as the first, wave is passed, we shall relieve a number of generals who are perfectly all right; we’ll simply order them — even a Field Marshal — to take a furlough so that they will return to the front completely relaxed.

You’ve got to imagine the situation. He has always got to spar around with all kinds of miserable elements out there. So it’s no wonder that after two years he loses his nerve. . . . Then things w hich to us in the rear don’t appear so terrible seem unbearable to him. Last winter we had cases where people up front simply lost their nerve under catastrophic weather conditions; they said, “It‘s easy for them in the rear to talk, they don’t have to stay in this weather.” That’s right, too. But we should also guard against exposing people constantly to the same conditions. If I expose a high staff to three weeks of mortar fire, I can’t be surprised if they lose their nerve. . . . Except in the case of final decisions, where the general has to seize the flag because everything is at stake, he must be in the rear. You can’t command for any length of time surrounded by the roar of battle.

One thing is certain: in this comparatively narrow area one person must be able to survey the whole battle line. He doesn‘t even have the necessary communications; he has to depend upon instinct. But if you do that for two years, eventually your nerves go to pieces. That‘s the Reichsmarschall‘s impression, too. H5e says that Rommel has completely lost his nerve. . . .

THE SURRENDER AT STALINGRAD

February 1, 1943. This conference began at 12.17 P.M.; the closing time is not indicated in the manuscript.

PARTICIPANTS: Hitler, Buhle, Christian, Engel, Jeschonnek’ Jodl, Keitel, and Zeitzler.

A special communique of the Soviet Information Bureau published in the night of Sunday, January 31, to

Monday, February 1, 1943, announced that the Russian “forces on the Don front between January 27 and January 31 completed the annihilation of the German troops surrounded west of Stalingrad"; it stated that on January 31 the Russian forces had “captured Field Marshal von Paulus, commanding the group of German forces before Stalingrad, consisting of the 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army, his chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Schmidt, and the whole of his staff.”The Russian report then listed the various captured generals by name, among others Lieutenant-General von Seydlitz, commander of the LI Army Corps.

The following stenographic report of the meeting held by Hitler under the impact of this news is very badly preserved.

The meeting starts with a discussion between Hitler and Zeitzler on the possibility of a German withdrawal from the Donets Basin, where the advanced German positions were threatened by Russian attacks from the north and the southeast. Hitler wants to think over this problem but is reluctant to make the decision because he feels that without, the use of this industrial region he would not be able to resume offensive action in the East. The discussion then turns to Stalingrad.

HITLER: They have surrendered there formally and absolutely. Otherwise they would have closed ranks, formed a hedgehog, and shot themselves with their last bullet. When you consider that a woman has the pride to leave, to lock herself in, and to shoot herself right away³ just because she has heard a few insulting remarks, then I can’t have any respect for a soldier who is afraid of that and prefers to go into captivity. I can only say: I can understand a case like that of General (Giraud; we come in, he gets out. of his car and is grabbed. But —

ZEITZLER: I can’t understand it either. I’m still of the opinion that it might not be true; perhaps he is lying there badly wounded.

HITLER: NO, it is true. . . . They’ll be brought to Moscow to the GPU right away, and they’ll blurt out orders for the northern pocket to surrender too.⁴ ’That Schmidt will sign anything. A man who doesn’t have the courage, in such a time, to take the road that every man has to take sometime, doesn’t have the strength to withstand that sort of thing. He will suffer torture in his soul. In Germany there has been too much emphasis on training the intellect and not enough on strength of character. . . .

ZEITZLER: One can’t understand this type of man.

HITLER: Don’t say that. I saw a letter.... It was addressed to Below. I can show it to you. An officer in Stalingrad wrote: “I have come to the following conclusions about these people — Paulus, question mark; Seydlitz, should be shot; Schmidt, should be shot.”

ZEITZLER: I have also heard bad reports about Seydlitz. . . .

HITLER: .... In peacetime, in Germany, about 18,000 or 20,000 people a year chose to commit suicide, even without being in such a position. Here is a man who sees 50,000 to 60,000 of his soldiers die defending themselves bravely to the end. How can he surrender himself to the Bolshevists? Oh, that is —

ZEITZLER: That, is something one can‘t understand at all.

HITLER: But I had my doubts before. That was at the moment when I received the report that he was asking what he should do. How can he even ask about such a thing? From now on, even time a fortress is besieged and the commandant is called on to surrender, he is going to ask: “What shall I do now?” . . .

ZEITZLER: There is no excuse. When his nerves threaten to break down, then he must kill himself.

HITLER: When the nerves break down, there is nothing left but to admit that one can’t handle the situation and to shoot oneself. One can also say the man should have shot himself just as the old commanders who threw themselves on their swords when they saw that the cause was lost. That goes without saying. Even Varus gave his slave the order: “Now kill me!” . . .

ZEITZLER: It’s much easier for the leader of an outfit. Everyone is looking at him. It’s easy for him to shoot himself. It’s difficult for the ordinary soldier.

HITLER: .... This hurts me so much because the heroism of so many soldiers is nullified by one single characterless weakling — and that is what the man is going to do now. You have to imagine, he’ll be brought to Moscow — and imagine that rattrap there.⁵ There he will sign anything. He’ll make confessions, make proclamations. You will see: they will now walk down the slope of spiritual bankruptcy to its lowest depths. One can only say that a bad deed always produces new evils. . . . With soldiers, (he fundamental thing is always character, and if we don’t manage to instill that, if we just breed purely intellectual acrobats and spiritual athletes, we’re never going to get a race that can stand up to the heavy blows of destiny. That is the decisive point. . . .

JODL: I still have doubts.

HITLER: Sorry, but I don’t. You know, I don’t believe in these wounds that Paulus is supposed to have received either. That doesn’t seem to fit. . . .

What hurts me the most, personally, is that I still promoted him to Field Marshal. I wanted to give him this final satisfaction. That’s the last Field Marshal I shall appoint in this war. You must not count your chickens before they are hatched.

I don’t understand that at all.... So many people have to die, and then a man like that besmirches the heroism of so many others at the last minute. He could ha ve freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow. What kind of choice is that? It just doesn’t make sense. . . . It is tragic that such heroism is so terribly besmirched at the last moment.

JESCHONNEK: I consider it possible that the Russians have reported this on purpose. They are such clever devils.

HITLER: In a week they‘ll be on the radio.

JESCHONNEK: The Russians would even manage to let someone else speak for them.

HITLER: NO, they themselves will speak on the radio, You’ll hear it soon enough. They‘ll all speak personally on the radio. They‘ll ask the people in the pocket to surrender and they’ll say the most, disgusting things about the German Army, You have to realize that they will be brought to Moscow and put into the Liubianka, to be “worked over.” . . .

The surrender of Stalingrad was announced from Hitler’s headquarters on February 3, 1943, in the following manner: “ The battle for Stalingrad has ended. True to their oath to fight to the last breath, the 6th Army under the exemplary leadership of Field Marshal von Paulus has been overcome by the superiority of the enemy and by the unfavorable circumstances confronting our forces.”

THE JAPS AND THE AMERICANS

March 5, 1943. This conference lasted from 12.30 P.M. until 1.30 P.M.

PARTICIPANTS:Hitler, Christian, Hewel, Jodl, von Puttkamer, and Zeitzler.

The meeting opens with a long, detailed report by Zeitzler on the events of the previous days on the Eastern front and on the German troop dispositions there; after giving this report, Zeitzler leaves and Jodl speaks about the situation in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans; Hitler makes few comments on these reports. Jodl then discusses the situation in the Far East, including the disposition of American troops.

JODL: The Japanese are convinced that the European theater will remain the center of gravity in 1943.

HITLER: That doesn’t exactly please me.

JODL: The evacuation of Guadalcanal has succeeded.

HITLER: You can’t count too much on what the Japanese say. I don’t believe a word of it.

JODL: One shouldn‘t believe anything they say.

They are the only people who can tell you absolutely anything with a perfectly straight face.

HITLER: They stuff you with lies, and all of their statements are based on what later turns out to be deception.

HEWEL: Public opinion in America is very much inclined to consider the Pacific the main theater of war.

HITLER; I have read a comment by Dieckhoff.1 He denies that quite flatly. There‘s not the slightest truth in it. If you want to w in over the Americans, you have only to announce: (1) The war is fought for American interests: (2) liquidation of the British Empire; and (3) the principal enemy is Japan. Then you have the great majority on your side. The Jews don‘t agree with all of these points, but the others are in the great majority. The English are beginning to complain more and more about political developments and are terribly worried that these are turning against their Empire.

HEWEL: It would be interesting to find out how the American divisions in North Africa are. Neurath flew in from Tunis last night.2 He has interesting things to tell. He has interrogated American prisoners, and he says it’s unbelievable. Most of them have come over to make money, and to have new experiences, and to see something new, to take part in something. There’s not a trace of political conviction. They are rowdies who‘ll take to their heels very quickly; they won’t be able to weather a crisis. . . .

HITLER: That will never become another Rome. America will never become the Rome of the future. Rome was a community of farmers.

HEWEL: But the Americans do have good human materia I somewhere.

JODL: Only superficially.

HITLER: Not as much as we have been told. It is concentrated in a few areas which are known to Europeans. . . . The farmers are terribly rundown. I have seen photographs. You can’t imagine anything as miserable and as degenerate as the farmers; a completely uprooted mob, wandering all over the place.3

CHRISTIAN: They have no spirit, no inner pride.

JODL: They have nothing like that.

HEWEL: Just look at their war posters. They are completely impossible.

HITLER: There is no doubt that, of the AngloSaxons. the English are the best.

JODL: One has the feeling that the English are fighting for their country and their Empire. One never has this feeling about the Americans.

HITLER: That may be the reason why the English say that they can always handle the Americans.

HEWEL: That’s a frivolous attitude. They won‘t be able to handle them because they will become dependent on them economically and in every other way. But politically and militarily they feel so superior to the Americans that they say: “In ten years we will make up for that.” One hears that from many Englishmen. I consider that very frivolous.

HITLER: But on the other hand, Jodl, one thing is clear, and that is the great strength which lies not only in the size of the population but simply in the magnitude of the national territory. Just look at the Chinese Empire. They‘ve been fighting there for five years. Bart of the country is occupied, but the structure as a whole is still standing.

JODL: It is holding out almost without weapons.

HITLER: If we can‘t increase our space, it will mean our end. Space is one of the most important, military factors. You can conduct military operations only if you have space. Only he who has space can survive the wars of the future. That was the misfortune of the French. In a single drive last year, we occupied more territory than in our whole Western offensive. France was finished off in six weeks, but in this huge space one can hold on and on. If we had had a crisis like this last one, on the old German border along the Oder-Wart he curve, Germany would have been finished. Here in the East we were able to cushion the blow. We I ave a battlefield here which has room for strategical operations.

JODL: Things have changed; at the time of the Roman wars Germany was space. In the Middle Ages they marched all over Germany on foot, and now in the age of tanks and planes–

HITLER: In a fast plane one can fly over the whole old Empire in 1¼ hours.

JODL: While the Russian space is a space that even the airplane can’t handle. One can see that in the industrial region in the Urals. We can’t reach it....

THE RAIDS ON HAMBURG

July 25, 1943. The starting time of this conference is not indicated in the manuscript; it ended at 2.12 P.M.

PARTIPANTS: Hitler, Buhle, Christian, Darges, Hewel, Jodl, Junge, Keitel, von Puttkamer, Warlimont, Zeitzler.

This record is fragmentary. The beginning is missing. The immediate cause of the discussion was the series of Allied air raids on Hamburg, which had started the night before. This extended attack commenced the saturation raids on German cities which continued until the end of the war.

HITLER: I have already told you, when we discussed this a few days ago, that terror can only be broken by terror. One has to counterattack, everything else is nonsense. In my opinion all this mining is worthless; it gives no lift to our people and it doesn‘t affect thosepeople over there either. Maybe YOU think it has a psychological effect on the German people if the enemy has losses through mines. It doesn’t impress them a bit. There is no use now in talking about, enemy ships being sunk. It is quite a different business when in one night, in Hamburg, a hundred thousand people have to be evacuated and shipyards are destroyed. That’s a much greater loss. We can‘t act irresponsibly any longer. In my opinion we should use our planes for attacking them directly, especially since they are putting so many planes into the air.

CHRISTIAN: My Führer, that is just why we have come to the conclusion that it is of no use to make a terror raid on a small town with 50 planes; that makes no impression at all. Instead one has to use those 50 planes to achieve an indirect result, so that they have to divide their forces and can’t come with 500 planes at once. In my opinion this is the only way.

HITLER: .... I don‘t think that you can do that. We’ve reached the point where we have to be glad if our men even find London. Today they tell me, “We hope to find London all right.” That’s a damned shame, and I’m going to tell the same thing to the Reichsmarsehall; and I’m not going to mince words. . . .

There follows a brief exchange about the possibility of attacking English airfields. Hitler denies the usefulness of such operation.

Terror can only be broken by terror. That they attack airfields moves me little. But if they smash our cities in the Ruhr— And the enemy is so sensitive. A few bombs with the new explosive, and those people were terrified. “The Germans have new weapons.”I don’t know why everyone wants to handle them with kid gloves. We can only stop this business if we get at ihe people over there. Otherwise our own people will gradually go crazy. Eventually the time will conic when our people will lose all confidence in the Air Force. It is almost partly gone anyway. You can’t just tell them: “We’ve dropped mines over there.” If they appear over Hamburg, it doesn’t matter if they have 400 to 500, or only 200 or 300 planes. But we are handling them with kid gloves. It is going to work only if we attack their cities systematically. But all the time I am told things like “We couldn’t find that place” or “We don’t have enough planes”; but then it turns out we do have enough to do something else. The next time I am told, “That would have no effect. We must use mines.” Then I’m told, “That anti-aircraft was too strong”; on the other hand I’m told, “The anti-aircraft has no effect at all.” The usual excuse I hear is “We can’t find it.” You can’t find London! A God-damned shame! And now some ass tells me, “My Führer, when they fly from England to Dortmund, their new radar enables them to make a direct hit on a building 500 meters wide and 250 meters long.“ Complete ass! But we can’t find London, which has a diameter of 50 kilometers and is 150 kilometers from the coast . Don’t think I’m saying this just to you; I told the others the same thing. It’s not your fault; you’re just my adjutant. I’m going to tell the responsible officers too.

CHRISTIAN: I’m still of the opinion that we just don’t have the 400 to 500 planes available needed to affect the enemy to ihe same degree.

HITLER: Thai’s not true.

CHRISTIAN: Our planes can’t carry that much.

HITLER: But the enemy has to fly further. We only have to fly one fifth as far as they do. To get to Hamburg they have to fly 600 kilometers, or even more.

JUNGE: At least 800.

HITLER: Mostly over the sea. We have only a short distance from our starting fields, so that should balance it. If we use the high-powered bomb, it will have a great effect. The important thing is to make them feel something. . . .

CHRISTIAN: On days when the enemy is making raids, he can’t, use his night fighters.

HITLER: Fine. Instead of monkeying around, let’s attack, get ready here, and pick out a target — it doesn’t matter what target. We can’t go on this way. Eventually the German people will go nuts. When I hear that we have committed 50 hit-andrun bombers, so and so many mine-laying planes, or have attacked an airfield somewhere or other, then I consider that a poor joke. That is avoiding the only effective method. Terror can only be broken by terror, and in no other way. . . . But the decisive tiling is that the English will stop only if their cities are knocked out, and for no other reason. These other measures might delay them for a night, but they won’t stop unless their cities are knocked out. That’s clear. I can only win the war if I destroy more of the enemy’s than he destroys of ours; by teaching him the terrors of war. That’s always been the way, and it’s the same thing with regard to air war. . . . Do we have a. report about how many aircraft losses the enemy admits, what, he has to say about Hamburg? . . .

DARGES: The English report that they have dropped 2000 tons of bombs, and that 12 of their bombers are missing.

HITLER: I want to know the exact points at which these 13 [sic] were shot down.

CHRISTIAN: Yes, but that takes longer now because w e don’t allocate any gas for that. They just send people out with bicycles.

HITLER: That has to be done, or else you won’t be able to make a report. You’ll have to send them out with bicycles.

(To be continued)