Washington

on the World Today

THERE is at last full realization in Washington that there are two sides to almost every question relating to Vietnam. The Administration wishes that its critics would come to this same understanding of the complexities of the problem. It has taken some officials a long time and many humiliations to learn that there are no sure solutions, and that the nation is confronted today with a condition, not a theory.

It is easy to advocate withdrawal from Vietnam, or a neutralization of Vietnam, or a blockade of Haiphong, or an ultimatum to Hanoi and Peking. But all these actions would involve risks and uncertainties at a time when Washington must reconsider its own and its allies’ interests. More than a score of nations are dependent to some degree upon the outcome. A year ago the President believed that bombing attacks on North Vietnam would force it to negotiate. Six months ago he believed that a peace offensive might persuade it. He was wrong in both instances. The enemy is tougher and more determined than he realized.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield has proposed that a summit conference of Asian nations be convened in Asia to work out a Vietnamese settlement, a suggestion which the Administration was prompt to welcome. But can Senator Mansfield suggest how to persuade Hanoi and Peking to participate in such a conference?

It is easy to say, as Arthur Calwell, leader of Australia’s opposition Labor Party, said to Vice President Humphrey about Vietnam: “We think it is an unwinnable war and we think it might escalate. We want a negotiated peace.” Calwell expressed the sentiments of many people, though not those of the Australian government, which fully supports the United States effort. But the question is, how can a negotiation be started? Calwell did not answer that, and he did not propose a withdrawal of American and Australian troops from Vietnam. What would be the effect on Australia and on New Zealand, which also has fighting forces in Vietnam, of a decision to abandon the South Vietnamese? Both governments believe that their frontier is in Vietnam.

What would be the effect in Japan and in South Korea? Many experts are convinced that the South Korean government would fall almost at once if a decision were made to withdraw from Vietnam. Seoul has committed about 40,000 men, the largest force next to the United States’s, to the aid of Vietnam. Some experts even believe that the pro-American government in Japan, which has given virtually no support to our stand in Vietnam, nevertheless would not be able to survive a victory of the Communist forces. In their view, a new government in Tokyo, probably dominated by the Socialists, would be inclined to turn its back on the West and to seek a settlement with Peking.

Our Asian allies

The United States has built powerful air bases in Thailand with the approval of the Thai government, which is absolutely convinced that its first line of defense is in Vietnam. In Burma, a neutralist government has attempted to maintain its independence in the face of considerable Chinese Communist pressure. It has been forced to make concessions, yet General Ne Win, who rules with an iron hand, is anti-Communist. He has accepted an invitation to visit President Johnson this fall, but if the situation in Vietnam deteriorates seriously, he may reconsider his decision to come to the United States. Most Washington experts on Asia applauded the President’s decision to invite Ne Win as a means of keeping communications open with an important Southeast Asian country. Ne Win someday may be able to play an intermediary role in Vietnam.

What America does in Vietnam also has a direct effect on our ally the Philippines, as well as on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. In both Manila and Seoul, plans to send more troops to Vietnam were held up when the Buddhists rioted against the Ky government.

From President Johnson’s viewpoint, having committed a quarter million men to Vietnam and won the support of countries from Korea to New Zealand and from the Philippines to Thailand, Washington has no alternative to present policy, which involves gradual escalation of the fighting in the south and of bombing in the north. The policy has not proved to be notably successful, yet the Administration does not have a better one.

Washington is gambling that no Saigon government will invite the United States to leave, and it has witnessed so many coups and disturbances in Vietnam that it thinks it will survive a new one. Being convinced that the infiltration is directed from the north and that the fighting involves much more than a civil war, the Administration is unable to retreat.

When President Eisenhower first talked about the domino theory, there were many who did not believe him. Yet in the view of Washington officials, the theory is more valid today than it was in the mid-1950s. A formidable defense arrangement has been built around the American decision to defend South Vietnam from aggression. A collapse of that system would affect every nation in Southeast Asia, many that are washed by the Pacific, and others as well, notably India.

No false optimism

All of the President’s military advisers were encouraged by the military progress being made earlier in the year. At the same time, civilian advisers acknowledged that progress in developing South Vietnam’s political and economic institutions was distressingly slow. The grand promises made in Honolulu in February should have been made years earlier. For as almost every visitor has noted, the military campaign cannot be entirely successful until much broader development is achieved on the economic, social, and political fronts.

Perhaps the realization of these facts is the beginning of wisdom. Washington at last recognizes that ultimate success depends as much on political and social achievements as on military victory. It is therefore more fully prepared now than at any other time to support developmental programs. And it is focusing new attention on the possibility of deeper diplomatic probes, without much hope of easy agreement. There is no false optimism in Washington any longer.

While critics have said that the Honolulu conference and its identification of Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky with President Johnson prompted the Buddhist outbreaks, Administration officials can only argue that it was not that simple. Moreover, they say that the conference, with its emphasis on development, was essential to the main purpose in Vietnam. While observers on the scene are cynical about the chances of success, having seen so many pacification programs fail, American officials involved are convinced that they are on the right track. They point to the constructive work being done in connection with schools, farms, hospitals, village development, irrigation, roads, and housing.

Tractors versus weapons

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professor Donald S. Zagoria of Columbia University touched on the problem of development in discussing why Chinese Communist influence in the underdeveloped world “is now at an all-time low.” China’s failures “are essentially the result of its erroneous assessment of the forces at work in the Afro-Asian world,” Professor Zagoria said. “Peking’s product-mix of subversion, helpful revolutionary hints, and polemics on the evils of imperialism has inevitably found only a limited market where economic development and nation-building are the primary concerns.” America’s greatest hope in these areas lies in its commitment to development.

One day during his Asian tour in February, Vice President Humphrey was flying low over northeastern Thailand to see the road construction, river and irrigation projects, and other development work that had been started. Humphrey was on his way to Laos for a meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma, Laotian Prime Minister. Several American AID officials from Thailand and Laos were pointing out to the Vice President the projects in connection with the Mekong River development program. The possibilities seemed to be limitless in that area of one of the world’s greatest rivers. “Why,” Humphrey suddenly exploded, “does not everybody concern himself with development instead of destruction? You would think the Communists would have enough to do building their own societies without becoming involved in attacks on others.”

In Vientiane, Souvanna Phouma, after conferring with Humphrey, explained what he wanted for his divided country, which had only ninety high school graduates last year and which desperately needs to expand rice production to make up for war losses. With many of the country’s young men in the armed services, the Prime Minister said, “it is necessary to replace hands with machines.” He said he would “much prefer tractors to weapons.”

Progress in Korea

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is almost dogmatically convinced that politicians who prefer weapons to tractors cannot in the long run survive in this age where development is the primary need of the world’s peoples. Rusk believes that other adventurers are doomed to the same fate as Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and Sukarno. The demand for development is a natural stimulant for the type of expansion the capitalproducing countries can help encourage.

Although progress in some countries that have received aid has been slow, there has been enough improvement elsewhere to convince men like the Vice President, AID director David E. Bell, and many others that our efforts should be increased rather than reduced. In Korea, for example, almost devastated by war a decade and a half ago, the Vice President saw surprising results. Despite inflation and high unemployment, the gross national product has grown 8 percent annually for the last three years. Industrial production has increased more than 50 percent in five years. The number of elementary students has doubled in ten years, as has the number of university graduates. Some experts believe that South Korea will be agriculturally selfsufficient within five years.

Even more impressive progress has been made in Taiwan, which no longer receives American economic aid. A study recently completed by Neil H. Jacoby, dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of California at Los Angeles, examines the strengths and weaknesses of the American aid program in Taiwan. His conclusions are encouraging. He found that Taiwan was transformed from a condition of “deep economic dependence in 1951 to self-sufficiency in 1965.”

The success there can be duplicated elsewhere given proper conditions and skillful direction, he said. Progress may even be possible in Vietnam. Some of the development programs there, small though they are, are heartening. Development is absolutely essential in Thailand if that potentially rich land is not to suffer the same kind of devastation being wrought in Vietnam today.

The war and taxes

In attempting to finance the Vietnam war, the President has been understandably reluctant to impose controls or taxes that would check the extraordinary advance of the economy. The record of growth of the last five years has been accomplished with less pressure on prices than in any other boom in the nation’s history. High employment and high wages constitute an almost unbeatable platform.

Only a few years ago there was deep concern that the high rate of unemployment could never be substantially reduced and that automation would pose an increasing threat to jobs. Now we know that those fears were groundless. If demand is adequate, jobs will be created, and many social ills will be alleviated. Demand has been maintained at a high rate for five years, with a steady decline in unemployment. No political leader would want to put on the brakes too hard, and that is why the President has not asked for higher taxes. There are strong arguments for permitting the economy to operate at full speed.

But if it goes too fast, higher taxes will be necessary. Flexibility is required if the economy is to operate successfully. When taxes were reduced in 1964, the economy was stimulated, as the President’s economic advisers said it would be. Now many of those who joined him in fighting for a tax cut believe that a modest tax increase is required to check inflation. There is nothing inconsistent in their stand.

President Kennedy argued that the Chief Executive should have power to raise or lower federal income taxes within a limited range as the needs of the economy dictated. He told Congress that the authority was needed to enable the government to act “more promptly, more flexibly and more forcefully to stabilize the economy.” But Congress never seriously considered the Kennedy proposal. It jealously guards its power to impose taxes. Knowing that the proposal would not be acted upon, Johnson never renewed the Kennedy request. Yet nearly all economists agree that it would be helpful if the President were in a position to increase or to reduce tax rates to a limited degree. The time may come, perhaps when Congress is not in session, when a quick reduction in the tax rate would prevent a recession or a quick increase would prevent inflation.

De Gaulle to Moscow

Washington is watching with some amusement and with some apprehension President Charles de Gaulle’s long-advertised visit to the Soviet Union this month. During the Communist Party Congress in Moscow earlier this year, the delegates twice applauded De Gaulle’s name when it was mentioned by a Communist delegate from France. There will be applause again when De Gaulle arrives in the Soviet Union. But many experts in Washington are convinced that the applause may not be without some misgivings. The Kremlin is happy to see any attack on NATO; at the same time, it realizes that NATO is an instrument for keeping Germany in check.

If De Gaulle attempts a rapprochement with Russia at the expense of Germany, he will encourage those Germans who believe that they must fight for German reunification. Paris is no threat to the Soviet Union; Bonn could be.